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Chapter One 
COMMODITIES, 
CHARACTERISTICS OF 
COMMODITIES, 
CHARACTERISTICS OF 
PEOPLE, UTILITIES, AND THE 
QUALITY OF LIFE 
A. I. CULT -ER' 
This paper tries to set research into the quality of life — especially in 
the sub-territory of QALY research and health status measurement 
— into a wider context that taxonomizes concerns of both researchers 
and their customers, and of researchers coming from different 
disciplinary backgrounds, according to thing- and people- 
orientation. Within this framework I shall try to show that the limit- 
ations of welfarism and utilitarianism as normative frameworks for 
discussing quality of life, though profound, paradoxically emphasize 
the importance of utility theory. I shall also try to show that there 
are many unresolved ethical questions. One is whether quality of life 
is to be seen as an absolute or relative idea. Another is whether 
taking account of distributional aspects of the quality of life or stan- 
dards of living is done best by looking at outcome distribution, the 
commodity distribution, or by applying individual a priori weights 
to relevant characteristics of people. Because social scientists do not 
share common meanings even when they use common words (like 
welfare, utility, utilitarian, and relative) I have tried to make clear 
my own meanings and hope that any residual ambiguity will not 
materially get in the reader's way. 
I want to begin by making some distinctions based on ideas 
developed by Sen (1982:30). The key idea is to distinguish between 
categories describing things and their characteristics on the one 
hand, and people and theirs on the other. The distinction between 
the two is not advanced as any kind of fundamental Cartesian 
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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS 
dualism but rather as a heuristic device that usefully introduces a 
thought-provoking symmetry in the principal approaches to quality 
of life that are found in the literature. Even as a heuristic device, as 
will be seen later, it has some limitations. For the moment, however, 
it serves. 
On the left hand side of Figure 1.1 is 'the universe of things'. This 
consists of commodities, that is, goods and services in the everyday 
sense, whose demand and supply, and whose growth, have been a 
traditional focus of economists' attention and whose personal 
distribution has been a traditional focus of all social scientists having 
an interest in distributive justice. These commodities have char-
acteristics. It also happens that these characteristics are a way in 
which we often describe the quality of goods. It is self-evident that 
the quality of commodities is not at all, however, the same thing as the 
quality of life. 
In explaining aspects of consumer behaviour some economists 
(notably Lancaster 1971) have reinterpreted traditional demand 
theory (for commodities) as a demand for characteristics (of com-
modities). This has been done by supposing that rational utility 
maximizers derive utility not so much from goods and services per se, 
as in the traditional approach, as from the characteristics of goods. 
In terms of the first example in Figure 1.1: the demand for steaks is 
to be explored in terms of the demand for the characteristics of 
steaks (juiciness, etc.). Similarly, the welfare (or quality of life) of 
1  individuals is to be explored in terms of the utility of characteristics such as these. 
Both traditional welfare economics and the 'characteristics' 
approach proceed to utility (provisionally taken as synonymous with 
happiness or pleasure — more on this anon) directly without the 
intervening category 'characteristics of people' (we had better avoid 
the seemingly eugenic term 'quality of people'). It is in this way that 
quality of life is usually defined: either directly in terms of the 'wel-
fare' that is got from goods, or indirectly in terms of the 'welfare' 
I' that is got from the characteristics of goods. 
1 	 The intervening category consists of non-utility information about 
I people. This may relate back (in a causal way) to the consumption 
of either commodities or the characteristics of commodities. It may 
also simply relate to inherent characteristics of people — for example, 
1 their genetic endowment of health, their relative deprivation 
I independent of the absolute consumption of commodities or the 
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characteristics of commodities, their moral 'worth' and 'deserving-
ness'. It may, further, relate to the character of relationships between 
I people such as the quality of friendships, community support for the 
individual when in need, social isolation, or changes in them, such 
as becoming (as distinct from being) divorced. 
These non-utility bits of information about people do not usually 
form a part of the conventional measurement of standards of living 
(at least in the work of economists) though the 'social indicators 
movement' has consistently taken a non-utility focus. The con-
ventional approach was, on the contrary, what one may call welfarist 
(Sen 1979). Welfarism holds that the standard of living, quality of 
life, efficiency of social arrangements, even the justice of distri-
butions and redistributions, are all to be judged or evaluated in 
terms of the utilities of the individuals concerned. I use the term uti-
litarianism to denote a specific form of welfarism using the additional 
ethical principle that the total utility, or average utility, ought to be 
maximized. The Paretian method of welfare economics is also 
welfarist though it is not utilitarian in the rather restrictive sense in 
which I am using the term. 
i 	 The explicit introduction of characteristics of people opens up an 
I alternative or supplementary, non-utility, view of the quality of life, 
defined in terms of these characteristics. As in the first example in 
Figure 1.1, the characteristics may be related to levels of nourish-
ment, fellowship at meal times, and the like. This approach seems to 
be characteristic of, for example, Townsend's (1979) concept of 
poverty (though that is rather heavily commodities-focused). It is 
also characteristic of the health measurement movement, 'QALYs, 
health indices, and all that. The categorization in Figure 1.1 is also 
one into which at least one tradition in the discussion of 'need' fits 
(e.g. Culyer 1976). If the characteristics of people are a way of 
describing deprivation, desired states, or significant changes in 
people's characteristics, then commodities and characteristics of 
commodities are what is often needed to remove the deprivation or 
to move towards the desired state, or to help people cope with 
change. They are the necessary means to a desired end. To compare 
the ill-health of different individuals or groups is not the same as to 
compare the health care they have received (they could receive the 
same amounts and still be unhealthy, or different amounts and be 
equally healthy). Nor is it the same as their pleasure (a sick optimist 
may have far more pleasure from life than a well grumbler). In 
12  
short, a focus on characteristics of people is not the same as a focus 
on commodities, characteristics of commodities, or utilities and it 
has some distinct advantages over these other approaches. 
WHY CHARACTERISTICS, NOT UTILITIES? 
One set of reasons for paying more attention to characteristics than 
utilities has been given by Williams: 
The characteristic approach of economists to the valuation of 
social goods is to try to find some private good which is 
systematically related to it, and by measuring the values people 
place on the latter, make some inferences about the implicit 
(upper or lower bounds of) values they place on the former. . . . 
On occasions, however, social policy confronts problems where 
the community has explicitly rejected one or another of the basic 
assumptions on which this approach rests. Among these basic 
assumptions, two are especially importanteople are the 
best (or even sometimes the sole) judges of their own welfarei, 
and "(2)7the preferences of different individuals are to be weighted 
according to the prevailing distribution of income and wealth. In 
some areas of social policy (e.g. mental illness and physical 
handicap), the first assumption is challenged, and over a much 
wider range of social concerns the second one is considered 
ethically unacceptable as the basis for public policy valuations. 
(Williams 1977:282) 
This paper — while not dissenting from Williams' arguments —
makes a rather more general argument for the 'characteristics of 
people' approach: more general in the sense that it will encompass 
both efficiency and distributional types of concern and more general 
also in the sense that it transcends traditional utilitarianism. 
The odd idea has grown up (even amongst non-economists) that 
welfarism is the economist's only way of approaching these 
questions. For example, in discussing Williams (1985) on QALYs, 
Smith (1987:1135) stated: 'A cost-effectiveness approach to the allo-
cation of health resources presupposes a simple utilitarian or 
Benthamite concept of justice.' Fortunately that is not so — and it is 
fortunate not only because the sort of things that concern Smith (the 
variance in rather than the unweighted sum total of 'health') are 
13 
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themselves as exclusive as welfarism. It is just not true that the 
1 QALY/CEA approach commits us to 'simple' welfarist concepts (for example, less 'simple' are maximin notions or a specially weighted 
, sum of utilities). More important is that the QALY/CEA approach 
1 need not be utilitarian at all. For, although the QALY/CEA 
11 approach can focus on the fourth column in Figure 1.1 (utility), it can also focus on the third column: characteristics of people. To 
\ focus here is not to focus on utility. 
Suppose that there were two individuals whose claims on 
resources were being assessed. One is a perfect pleasure machine 
who gets ten times more pleasure out of a given income than the 
other, a chronic arthritic. 'Simple' utilitarianism will take no cog-
nizance of this fact, focusing on the marginal utility of each. If the 
arthritic had a lower marginal utility of income than the pleasure 
machine, simple utilitarianism would have us take income from 
him or her and transfer it to the pleasure machine, because the uti-
lity loss to the low marginal utility person will be smaller than the 
utility gain to the high marginal utility person, and arthritis is an 
irrelevance — unless suffering from it affects the utility of income (at 
the margin). Utilitarianism may even have us do that if the pleasure 
machine were already richer (in income) than the arthritic, provided 
I of course that the machine's utilitygain still exceeded the poor and 
iS M arthritic person's utility loss. 	 I) ! ts ivt V 
Now that seems out of tune with what we intuit to be the right 
thing to do. Suppose, then, one focused on total utilities instead of 
the marginal. (Can one take this to be a slightly less 'simple' utili- 
0 tarianism?) Suppose one wanted to equalize each person's utility as 
much as possible given their initial combined incomes. If the 
arthritic had lower utility than the pleasure machine all would be 
well, or at least, if not all, the redistribution would go in the right 
direction (just as it would had the arthritic had a higher marginal 
utility of income under 'simple' utilitarianism). But now suppose 
that is not the case. The arthritic, despite the pain and incapacity, 
has an invariably sunny disposition while the pleasure machine, 
though efficient at manufacturing pleasure out of income, is of a 
melancholic cast, a Calvinist convinced of not being among the 
chosen. Now, even if the arthritic has the higher marginal utility of 
income, we shall no longer even judge that state to be deprived (in 
terms of total utility or pleasure). Once again, something seems to 
have gone wrong. Intuition tells us that the arthritic is in some sort 
of need, does need help, is deserving of our sympathy. 
What may be going wrong is that the utilitarian approach, like all 
welfarist approaches, rejects all non-utility information about people 
as being irrelevant in judgements about efficiency and justice. This 
is why I said earlier that it was 'fortunate' that the QALY/CEAl 
approach to decision making is not dependent on welfarist concepts,i 
for it is its ability to exploit other descriptive characteristics of people 
(like whether they are crippled from arthritis) that makes it 
decisively non-welfarist. 
Sen (1980) has developed the notion of 'basic capabilities'. These I 
refer to one's capability of functioning: what one can do — getting 
around, looking after oneself (and others), earning a living, having 
discussions about the quality of life, and so on. If you think of 
`standard of living' or 'quality of life' in terms of capabilities of func-
tioning then you can immediately see that one may be rich (have 
lots of commodities) but have a low standard of living. One may be 
deliriously happy (have lots of utility) but have a low standard of 
living. Sen's notion of capabilities thus shares with my 'characteri-
stics of people' the idea that utility focuses too much on mental and 
emotional responses to commodities and characteristics of com-
modities and not enough on what they enable you to do. 
The notion of basic capabilities has lots of attractions. One is that 
it seems to provide what is missing in welfarism. Another is its 
evident culture-contingency. (Some may dub it 'relative' but I prefer t 
to use this adjective in a more restrictive sense.) Yet another is the 
(again evident) way in which the notion encourages practical people 
to think explicitly about the capabilities that are to be reckoned rele-
vant, how they are to be weighted, and so on. Yet we should be 
cautious before committing ourselves to the 'basic capabilities' 
approach. For one thing, we need to give a lot more thought to the 
meaning and significance of 'basic'. Indeed, it may be prudent to 
use the more general notion of 'characteristics of people' rather than 
`basic capabilities' precisely because it does not involve the prior 
exclusion of some characteristics (whatever they may be) that the 
criterion of 'basic' (whatever it may be) clearly does. 
Another reason for caution is that it does not seem that only 
capabilities enter the notion of 'standard of living' or 'quality of life'. 
There are other attributes that we may want to add in that are still 
not commodities, characteristics of commodities, or utility, but 
neither are they capabilities. If our arthritic is in pain, that is a factor 
14 15 
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to take account of in assessing the quality of life. If the arthritic is 
bereft of friends, that too should be taken into account. So is 
I whether or not a person is stigmatized (even if the stigma does not 
/deprive a person of commodities). 'Characteristics' seems to me to 
be altogether a more open category and one capable of exciting the 
imagination out of conventional and tram-lined ways of thinking 
about quality of life. 
There is a further reason for judging the characteristics approach 
a good one: it enables a more effective cross-disciplinary dialogue. 
For example, the characteristics approach to social deprivation is 
extremely sympathetic to Townsend's approach to poverty measure-
ment and, indeed, provides a systematic theoretical underpinning 
for it (but see Townsend 1985). More importantly, the character-
istics approach, even in its 'basic capabilities' version, like all good 
theoretical underpinnings, has the ability to clarify and surprise. It 
has that quality so nicely termed `Aha-ness' by Blaug (1980:6). 
UTILITY WITHOUT UTILITARIANISM 
One should caution against a too complete rejection of utilitarian-
ism. Indeed, there is one respect in which utilitarianism has a great 
deal to offer even those committing themselves to a 'characteristics 
of people' approach. 
Etzioni (1986) has identified three main variations in economists' 
use of the concept of utility. First is the original concept, that of the 
pleasure of the self, which has been used in this paper so far. This 
concept provides the human psychology of neo-classical economics 
and underlies the ethics of welfarism. 
The second is an expanded version of the first encompassing the 
satisfactions a person gains both from his own consumption of goods 
(or characteristics of goods) and from that of others. This is utility 
interdependence, a species of externality, that is increasingly used 
 
(though still not widely) by economists working on topics in social 
policy, and that has given rise to economic interpretations of altru : 
 ism and caring (e.g. Culyer 1983). 
The third is the use of the term 'utility' as a formal attribute, 
having no substantive attributes: a means merely of ranking prefer-
ences or choices. As Alchian put it: 
For analytical convenience it is customary to postulate that an 
16 
individual seeks to maximize something subject to some 
constraints. The thing — or numerical measure of the 'thing' —
which he seeks to maximize is called 'utility'. Whether or not 
utility is some kind of glow or warmth, or happiness, is here 
irrelevant; all that counts is that we can assign numbers to 
entities or conditions which a person can strive to realize. Then 
we say the individual seeks to maximize some function of those 
numbers. Unfortunately, the term 'utility' has by now acquired 
so many connotations, that it is difficult to realize that for the 
present purposes utility has no more meaning than this. 
(Alchian 1953:73; italics added) 
Etzioni condemns all three forms of what he calls the 'mono-
utility paradigm' on the grounds that they omit too much that is 
relevant (echoes on the behavioural front of Sen on the ethical) and 
in particular he heaps scorn on the poverty of the third use as a 
motivational basis for behaviour (animal or human). 
This condemnation, no matter how right on the grounds of 
making a satisfactory theory of human behaviour, seems too total. In 
particular, I want to argue (not for the first time, see Culyer 1983) 
that the third usage of the concept of 'utility' is important even for 
those espousing the 'characteristics of people' approach to measur-
ing the quality of life. Its importance is twofold: in the first place, by 
its extensive exploration of 'measurement' the literature has clarified 
important meanings (e.g. ordinal, interval, and ratio scales), iden-
tified false interpretations (e.g. the non-uniqueness of elasticity 
measures of dependent variables measured on linear scales), and 
yielded up experimental techniques like the rating scale, the stan-
dard gamble, and the time trade-off method for the empirical study 
of the values that people have (and the differences that exist between 
them) (Torrance 1986). In the second place, this genre of the liter-
ature very precisely pinpoints the need for value-judgements: not 
merely about the selection of the characteristics to be included in an 
assessment of the quality of life, but also about the selection of the 
selectors; not only about the scaling of characteristics as 'better' or 
worse', but also about the ways in which characteristics should be 
traded-off; not only about overall weighted measures of the quality 
of life of one kind (for example, health) but how that compares (and 
interacts) with other aspects of the quality of life (for example, edu-
cation). It is notable that any systematic consideration of these 
17 
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1 aspects of the inherent value-content of quality of life measurement 
is often wholly absent from discussions of quality of life that are not 
informed by utility theory (e.g. Townsend 1979). 
These advantages of utility theory are most to the fore when one 
is dealing with multi-attribute notions of poverty, quality of life, 
health, and so on. As a practical matter it frequently happens that 
one is comparing individuals (or the same individual over time) for 
whom some attributes worsen and others improve. This is a good 
example of a way in which an aggregation process, instead of 
`destroying' information, can actually create it: specifically creating 
information about the severity (etc.) with which various attributes 
(whether they be commodities or characteristics) are regarded and 
the degree to which improvement in one (or more) may be regarded 
as compensating for worsening in others. Unless the researcher is 
prepared with a method for dealing with these issues there will be 
little alternative than to have recourse to arbitrary (usually personal) 
value judgements which may be proper for parents, or even social 
workers, but are scarcely appropriate for social scientists. 
Utility, therefore, remains a core concept, and the lessons learned 
about its measurability, its measurement, and the necessarily value-
laden steps needed to put substantive content into the abstract 
notion are essential lessons, even if you are not a welfarist. You still 
need utility theory even if you aren't a utilitarian! 
There is an aspect of these claims of 'clarifying' and 'pinpointing' 
(which many of us are wont to make) that is extraordinarily per-
plexing and not a little disturbing. Despite the explicitness of the 
non-utilitarian use of utility theory and the fact that the QALY 
approach to quality of life in health matters has repeatedly — and 
again explicitly — drawn attention to its value-judgemental content, 
readers whom one would take as normally sophisticated frequently 
interpret the approach in grotesquely perverse ways. Smith, for 
example, believes that the old and the very sick are necessarily discrim-
inated against- by the QALY approach and that a quantitative 
algorithm obscures the fact that arbitrary assessments of value-.are-
being made (Smith 1987). The truth is, however, that the QALY 
I approach can be made to 'discriminate' (if that's the word you want 
to use) against or in favour of whomsoever one pleases while it has 
t nothing at all to say about how the assessments of value ought to be 
made (let alone that they should be arbitrary). It has, by contrast, 
many suggestions about how they can, as a matter of fact, be made. 
QUALITY OF LIFE: RELATIVE OR ABSOLUTE 
One of the features of 'characteristics of people' to which I earlier 
drew attention is that relationships and positional aspects may be 
included amongst them. Sen has used the distinctions of Figure 1.1 in 
order to comment on the literature of relative deprivation (a liter-
ature whose contribution to the discussion of poverty he regards as 
valuable). In particular, he argues the subtle point that absolute 
deprivation in capabilities (but I shall continue to use the more 
inclusive 'characteristics of people') relates to relative deprivation in 
terms of commodities. 
This adds a useful insight into the meaning of poverty. The argu-
ment is that poverty is an absolute notion to do with the character-
istics of people rather than a purely relative one (in the sense of a ratio 
rather than context-dependent), though it remains relative (again in 
the ratio sense) in the universe of commodities. For example, the 
absolute element in poverty relates, let us suppose, to a further 
notion of being a member of the community. Being relatively 
deprived of particular commodities denies one this full membership. 
The absolute element is not fixed. It takes different things in dif-
ferent times and different places to enable each person to be iden-
tified as a member of the group. You can even conceive of 'degrees 
of membership' (e.g. first- and second-class citizenship). But, for all 
that, the basic notion is an absolute one and is to do with character-
istics of people. The relativist notion depends upon your access, 
possession, ownership, entitlement, and so on, to and of com-
modities relative to others. That is why poverty in Britain is differ-
ent, and differently seen, from poverty in Bangladesh. That is why, 
in today's Britain, it is important (following Townsend 1979) not to 
be deprived of holidays, TV sets, and Christmas presents. But, if you 
are relatively deprived of these things, and in Britain today, you are 
absolutely poor. 
The distinction may seem elusive. For a good example of how it 
can elude some subtle minds, see Townsend (1985) and Sen's reply 
(1985). It is rather like the notion of positional goods discussed by 
Hirsch (1977): if you want to enjoy the absolute advantage of 
sunbathing on an uncrowded beach, your ability to do so may well 
depend on your relative knowledge of the various available beaches 
compared with the knowledge of others. A differential advantage in 
information gives you an absolute advantage in enjoying the beach. 
18 19 
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Sen gives an example from Adam Smith: 'the Greeks and Romans 
lived . . . very comfortably though they had no linen, [but] in the 
present time, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-
labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen 
shirt' (1983:161). To avoid shame in different contexts and times 
may require different bundles of commodities and the bundles 
required (and the resources to acquire them) will often be defined 
relative to the bundles (and resources) of other people. But the 
avoidance of the shame is absolute not relative. It is not a question of 
being more or less ashamed, or even of having equal shame, but of 
avoiding shame altogether: absolutely. 
If one were to take another negative aspect of the quality of life, 
unemployment, cannot a similar argument be mounted? For 
example, even if the benefits in cash and kind available to the unem-
ployed were sufficient to protect them from poverty, unemployment 
remains an evil (and not merely an inefficient use — or, rather, 
non-use — of resources). This is because unemployment is doubly 
stigmatizing: one is stigmatized in one's own eyes as a failure and 
one is stigmatized publicly in the eyes of others. To avoid stigma it is 
necessary in our culture for people of particular ages, sexes, and 
physical and mental abilities to have employment. Stigma is abso-
lute; the avoidance of stigma is absolute. This is perfectly consistent 
with the possibility of stigma being scalable (viz measurable) in terms 
of more or less, worse or better. Stigma, of whatever degree, is the 
state you are in — but whether you are in it depends on your 
employment status relative to others. That status is positional. If no 
one works, no one is stigmatized. Among some South American 
tribes the skin disease, pinto, was so prevalent that those single men 
not suffering from it were regarded as pathological and excluded from 
marriage (Ackerknecht 1947). (For other medical and sociological 
examples of relativist-absolutist interractions in health see Culyer 
1978:96ff.) 
But we are running into difficulties with Figure 1.1, for the 
descriptor 'unemployed' is not descriptive of commodities but of 
people. What we have is some absolute characteristics of people 
being determined by some other relative characteristics of people. 
The framework seems to need enlargement to meet this important 
dimension of quality of life. That is a task I am not going to tackle 
here. 
Relativism seems . less important in health than in some other 
20 
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aspects of the quality of life, and this despite the well-known culture 
dependency of attitudes to pain, disability, and disease. In general, 
it seems that it is not the case that absolute notions of health (no 
matter how variable or culture-bound they may be) are dependent 
upon positional information about someone's relative access to care, 
their relative limitation of functional activity, and so on. Relativism 
does not usually play any major role in how we conceptualize or 
measure 'health'. The arrows in Figure 1.1 still convey the right 
sense of movement from left to right. Instead, however, of having 
(relative) lack of goods (absolute) poverty, we have (absolute) lack 
of health care, (absolute) presence of harmful pathogens, (absolute) 
prevalence of risky lifestyles —> (absolute) poor health. 
The same can probably not be said for quality of life itself. It is 
not very controversial to suggest that quality of life is to do with 
shared views about how one ought to be able to live. It is at least irl 
part to do with the absolute characteristics of people. It is by deri-i 
vation to do with commodities or their characteristics. But just ass, 
the general view about what a minimum 'decent' (absolute) quality' 
of life or standard of living is can vary over time and place, so can the 
relationship which the quality of life has to the commodities contri-
buting to it. 
What is more difficult to determine is whether the instrumental role 
of commodities, or characteristics of commodities, is relative or 
absolute. In part it is clearly relative: the 'keeping up with Joneses' 
effect. But it is also no less clearly absolute: I believe the quality of 
my life rises when I have more of particular commodities inde-
pendently of whether I have relatively more. It is not the same to me 
whether I have £1,000 more commodities per year or everyone else 
has £1,000 each less. 
My tentative conclusion is thus that in the meaning of 'poverty', 
relativity in commodities is very important. In the meaning of 
`health', relativity in commodities hardly matters at all. In the mean-
ing of 'quality of life' relativity and absoluteness in commodities 
both matter. In all three cases, poverty, health, and quality of life, 
the descriptive condition itself as a bundle of characteristics of 
people is, however, absolute. 
But in thus relegating relativism to a backseat in health, I do not 
want to be taken as automatically relegating inequality also to a back-
seat. Indeed, the question 'inequality of what?' in health policy is an 
issue that arises partly out of the taxonomy of Figure 1.1, and the 
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instrumental link between commodities, their characteristics, and 
the characteristics of people. 
HEALTH CARE: EQUALITY OF WHAT? 
There is a phrase in Smith's (1987) paper which is notable for having 
been picked up by none of his critics (Williams 1987; Evans 1987; 
Drummond 1987): 'a traditional clinical view would favour policies 
designed to allocate resources to those most in need of them with the 
general objective of reducing health variance' (Smith 1987:1135). It 
is not, perhaps, plausible to suppose that this really has been a tra-
ditional clinical view (it probably all depends upon the tradition!) 
but that should not distract our attention from the key idea that a 
distributional rather than a maximizing/optimizing objective should 
command centre-stage. 
One way of sharpening up perceptions about distributions is to -
look at some examples and ask ourselves what we think about them. 
Imagine that we have some non-controversial measure of health as a 
characteristic of people like QALYs measured on a ratio scale(!), a -
limited budget denominated in commodity units of resource, and a 
knowledge of the technology for transforming existing health states 
into better ones, as well as of the natural history of the diseases in 
question (so that we also know, for example, what happens if we do 
nothing). 
With those immodest requirements taken for granted, consider 
Table 1.1A. This shows three distributions: the first column shows a -
starting distribution of average health status per person across 
disease classifications, geographical regions or whatever (a, b, c, d). 
The second shows a distribution of twenty commodity units of 
resources (a stock taken as given for the purposes of the exercise) 
which, in Table 1.1A, is optimally distributed so as to maximize its 
impact on health. The resultant distribution of health is shown in 
the third column: given the starting point, commodities, prevailing 
technology, etc., the maximum final sum of health statuses is 250. 
The total product of the twenty resource units is, incidentally, 120 
(the difference between the final sum and what the sum would have 
been had no commodity-resources been applied) not twenty (the 
difference between the final and the initial totals). This you can infer 
from the information provided in Table 1.1D, which shows the 
marginal increases in health status from applying commodity- 
resources in five unit increments. Table 1.1A is thus showing what I 
take to be the 'simple utilitarian' view that so distressed Smith. 
Table 1.1B has the same initial distribution of health but a dif-
ferent distribution of the twenty units of commodities. Here they 
have been so applied as to reduce the variance in health to zero. The 
result is not only to reduce overall health status relative to the 
optimal (utilitarian) distribution — as must necessarily be the case by 
virtue of that distribution's optimality — but also to reduce average 
health in the community as a whole. I rather doubt whether the 'tra-
ditional clinical view' values reductions in variance that much. I have 
Table 1.1 	 Exemplary distributions of health, health care resources, and 
marginal products 
A. Health maximization 
(a)  
(b)  
(c)  
(d)  
100 100 
80 
5 ) ( 
100 
40 
(10) 
50 
10 
( 	 5 ) 
0 ( 0) 
230 20 250 
B. Health equalization 
(a)  100 50 0) ( 
(b)  80 50 0) ( 
(c)  50 40 ( 	 5 ) (d)  10 50 (15) 
230 20 200 
C. Commodities equalization 
(a)  100 ( 	 5 ) 100 0. (b)  80 70 • • 5 ) ( (c)  40 50 ( 	 5 ) (d)  10 10 110- ( 	 5 ) 
230 20 230 
D. Marginal products of commodities 
Increasing 	 Increasing 	 Increasing 
Effect of doing 
	 resources 	 resources 	 resources 
nothing 
	 from 0 to 5 
	
from 5 to 10 
	
from 10 to 15 
(a)  —50 50 < 30 <10 
(b)  —30 20 30 <10 
(c)  —10 20 < 30 <10 
(d)  — 10 10 30 10 
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made the numbers pose the question dramatically of course: but 
what is the acceptable price that one should pay for greater equality? 
Table 1.1C again has the same starting distribution but aims for 
equality of commodity distribution rather than equality of the final 
health distribution. (Imagine, if you like, that each of the groups a, 
b, c, and d has equal numbers of people in it so that the commodity 
equality is commodity equality per head.) As it happens, this 
produces an outcome that is no worse in total than the initial total 
and is quite close to the total with the efficient commodity allo-
cation. This feature has been deliberately built into the example in 
order to highlight what I conjecture may be the real concern of those 
who emphasize resource equality, namely that it approximates the 
optimal solution by concentrating more commodities on deprived 
groups for whom the marginal product of health services is relatively 
high. The equal resource distribution also lowers the variance of the 
final health distribution compared with the distribution associated 
with the optimal commodity deployment, though this is incidental 
for those whose ethical focus is on commodity equality alone. But, if 
it is true that 'commodity equalizers' are really covert outcome 
I maximizers, their egalitarianism is entirely instrumental, justified i because it is a useful rule of thumb rather than because it is inher-
t 
ently to be desired or is inherently ethical (Culyer 1988). When mere 
equality is not 'enough', such people will often advocate 'positive 
discrimination', thereby clearly proclaiming the (imperfect) instru-
mentality of commodity equalization. Instrumental egalitarianism 
seems worth differentiating from end-state egalitarianism. The 
reasoning in support of each is quite different and one certainly does 
not imply the other. 
In considering the trade-off between efficiency and the equality of 
the final distribution it is interesting to ask whether the fact that one 
is dealing with 'health' makes any difference from when one is deal-
ing with, say, 'income'. In both cases some gain and others lose as 
one moves from an equal to an efficient distribution, or vice versa. In 
both cases the efficient distribution has a larger total than the equal 
one. But does it make a difference that in the one case one is dealing 
with purchasing power and in the other with 'life'? Suppose, for 
example, that the health measure is 'lives saved' and that we make 
the value judgement that every life is of equal value whatever its 
length and quality and regardless of the intrinsic merits of the indi-
viduals in question. (I am not advocating these judgements.) In that 
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case equality actually involves the sacrifice — the 'unnecessary' sacri-
fice in the sense that with the resources available the sacrifice could 
have been avoided — of people. Human sacrifices. Does that not 
matter? What further differences would be made if you disallowed 
the judgements that I just claimed not to be advocating? Suppose 
the numbers represented 'life years' — so that the sacrifice was not of 
entire lifetimes, but only parts of lifetimes? Or suppose they were 
QALYs, so the sacrifice was of the lowest quality life-years? 
I do not know how others will answer these questions but I 
strongly suspect that, in order to answer them, one would want to 
adduce not only non-utility information but also non-health infor-
mation, just as in discussing efficiency and social justice more gener-
ally there is a good case for seeking out non-utility information. The 
sort of information is familiar and it is to do with still other char-
acteristics of people: age (do we not feel impelled to cherish the life-
years of the very young and the very old?), desert (do we not fee 
differently about the person whose poor health is the result of their 
own reckless behaviour from the way we feel about the person who 
is prudent?), do we not have a special attitude to those in important 
social positions, and so on. And now suppose that you have those 
weights right. Indeed, suppose they are embodied in the numbers in 
the first column of Table 1.1. Is there any distributional concern left 
that has not been embodied? If not, the maximizers have the day 
(though not the 'simple utilitarians'). If so, then we are perhaps at 
the heart of what it is that the egalitarians fear most from the maxi-
mizers. But what it can be I cannot discern! And what relation it 
may have to the quality of life I cannot fathom. 
END-PIECE 
I hope to have given you some prima facie grounds for questioning 
some of the common approaches to the quality of life — especially 
those dubbed `welfarise and some prima facie good reasons for 
pursuing an alter -rid-five - based on characteristics of people, I have 
argued that quantification of some sort is inescapable and that 
utility theory Ya
—
ssome cautionary as well as practical lessons to 
teach in this regard (especially for those who fear or are sceptical 
about quantification). I have also suggested that the proposed way of 
looking at things has the potential for radically altering the ways in 
which we think and talk about distributive justice. For some this is 
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not news. QALY researchers in particular have been using the char-
acteristics of people approach and utility theory without utilitarian-
ism for at least a decade. I have tried to show that this research 
programme can be seen as having its intellectual roots in a theory of 
the quality of life that encompasses, but is much more general than, 
the particular ethical apparatuses traditionally used by economists 
and other social scientists, and that this theory opens up a wide 
range of interesting and important questions both of principle and 
practice. 
NOTE 
1 I have benefited from correspondence with Amitai Etzioni, Michael 
Mulkay, Amartya Sen, Alwyn Smith, and Peter Townsend, from 
discussions at the conference, and I am also grateful for the comments of 
the editors. 
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